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Abstract:  We present how uncertainty and learning are classically studied in economic 
models. Specifically, we study a standard expected utility model with two sequential 
decisions, and consider two particular cases of this model to illustrate how uncertainty and 
learning may affect climate policy. While uncertainty has generally a negative effect on 
welfare, learning has always a positive, and thus opposite, effect. The effects of both 
uncertainty and learning on decisions are less clear. Neither uncertainty nor learning can be 
used as a general argument to increase or reduce emissions today without studying the 
specific intertemporal costs and benefits explicitly. Considering limits in applying the 
expected utility framework to climate change problems, we then consider a more recent 
framework with ambiguity-aversion which accounts for situations of imprecise or multiple 
probability distributions. We discuss both the impact of ambiguity-aversion on decisions and 
difficulties in applying such a non-expected utility framework to a dynamic context. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Climate policy decisions today have to be made under substantial uncertainty: the impact of 
accumulating greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is not perfectly known, the future economic 
and social consequences of climate change, in particular the valuation of possible damages, 
are uncertain. However, learning will change the basis of making future decisions on 
abatement policies. 
The issues of uncertainty and learning are often presented in a colloquial sense. Two opposing 
effects are typically put forward: First, uncertainty about future climate damage, which is 
often associated with the possibility of a catastrophic scenario is said to give a premium to 
slow down global warming and therefore to increase abatement efforts today. Second, 
learning opportunities will reduce scientific uncertainty about climate damage over time. This 
is often used as an argument to postpone abatement efforts until new information is received. 
The effects of uncertainty and learning on the optimal design of current climate policy are still 
much debated both in the academic and the political arena. 
In this paper, we present how uncertainty and learning are classically studied in economics. 
The characterization of uncertainty and learning in economics relates to early concepts 
introduced in mathematics and statistics. We believe that there is an interest in introducing 
these formal concepts to an interdisciplinary audience. Indeed what we present is now a 
common and broadly accepted approach in economics to formally study the effects of 
uncertainty and learning. Moreover, we illustrate how one can apply this approach to give 
insights into the climate change problem.  
We proceed as follows. We first define the concepts of uncertainty and learning within the 
classical framework of economic decision theory, namely the (Bayesian) expected utility 
framework. We consider a two-decision model that encompasses most existing 
microeconomics models that have analyzed the effects of uncertainty and learning. For the 
sake of illustration, we introduce two particular examples of this model. One example is a 
“climate change” model, and the other example is a “resource depletion” model. We show 
that the attitude of a decision-maker towards risk and the type of payoff function are 
instrumental to the sign of the effect of uncertainty and learning on optimal emissions 
reductions. Specifically, our results indicate that, compared to the reduction of emissions  Page  3  14/09/2007 
under certainty, uncertainty and learning generally cannot provide a clear argument for stricter 
abatement of emissions today or their postponement. 
While standard economic decision theory relies on an expected utility framework, empirical 
and experimental data have long suggested that this framework fails to explain observed 
individuals choices. In particular, the preferences of individuals in situations of imprecise or 
multiple probabilities are often not consistent with a single (objective or subjective) 
probability distribution as usually assumed by the theory of expected utility. Climate change 
policy is a classical example involving imprecise probabilities. Predictions are derived from 
different models whose results are often presented as a range of probabilities for a single event 
(IPCC, 2005).  
We thus consider an alternative to the expected utility framework that accounts for this type of 
uncertainty over probabilities, or “ambiguity”. We indeed consider that the study of the effect 
of ambiguity is a promising direction of research. We thus generalize the previous framework 
to illustrate some immediate implications of ambiguity for climate policy. We show that 
ambiguity typically leads to stricter abatement policies today. We also point out difficulties in 
applying such a non-expected utility theory to a dynamic framework where beliefs should be 
updated frequently to account for new information. We conclude the paper with a word of 
caution: the optimal response of climate policy to uncertainty and learning is sensitive to 
which decision theoretical framework is used. Furthermore, alternatives to the standard 
expected utility framework may have better descriptive power but also can generate 
unappealing normative effects. 
 
2. THE BASIC EXPECTED UTILITY FRAMEWORK 
We first consider a basic decision theoretic framework to study the effects of uncertainty and 
learning. We concentrate on a model where decisions have to be made at two different points 
in time. Let  t x  denote the decision in period  { } 1, 2 t ∈ .
1 The ex post utility derived from 
decisions  t x  is denoted by  12 (, ,) vx x θ  where the parameter θ  captures uncertainty, i.e. its 
realization might not be known when decisions are made.  
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, and in line with much of the literature, we assume that  is a member of  t x \ .  Page  4  14/09/2007 
The properties of the function  (.) v  capture the decision-maker (DM)’s preferences (e.g., the 
attitude towards risk) as well as characteristics of the economic environment, as we will see. 
Throughout the paper, we will consider two simple examples.  
Example 1. A two-period “climate change model”: 
12 1 2 1 2 (,, ) () ()( 1 ) ( ) vx x ux ux dx x θ θ = +− − +        (1) 
in which  (.) u  is the instantaneous utility derived from emissions in each period and 
(.) d  is the damage from climate change occurring in period 2. The extent of the 
(unknown) future damages is captured by the parameter  [0,1] θ ∈ . The function  (.) u i s  
assumed to be increasing and concave as, e.g., emission-intensive production can 
increase consumption and thereby utility albeit at decreasing marginal returns. The 
function  (.) d  is assumed to be increasing and convex, reflecting environmental 
damages due to climate change which are the more sensitive to increases in emissions, 
the larger the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere already is. Both functions 
are assumed to be continuously differentiable. 
Example 2. A three-period “resource depletion model”: 
12 1 2 1 2 (, ,) () () ( ) vx x ux ux u x x θ θ = ++ − −        (2) 
in which  (.) u  is the utility derived from resource consumption in each period and θ  is 
the total (unknown) stock size of the resource. The utility function  (.) u  is assumed to 
be increasing and concave, and continuously differentiable. This example can be 
interpreted in terms of climate policy as reflecting the intergenerational problem of 
“consuming the atmosphere”: the more climate change limits future production, i.e. 
the smaller θ , and the more emission-intensive products we consume today, the 
smaller are future consumption opportunities. 
In both examples we neither discount the flow of future utilities nor consider a limited 
atmospheric lifetime of greenhouse gases, i.e. we only consider the sum of period utilities and 
let the sum of emissions determine the future damages. While discount and atmospheric decay 
factors play a key role in the analysis of intertemporal climate policy decisions, their 
qualitative role in understanding the effect of uncertainty and learning is usually small and 
will be neglected here.   Page  5  14/09/2007 
In the following, we first report classical findings under the assumption that the DM 
maximizes expected utility. Namely, we assume that the DM has beliefs over θ , that can be 
captured by a probability distribution, and maximizes the expected value of the utility 
function  12 (, ,) vx x θ  based on using this probability distribution. Formally, the two-decision 
model is represented by the following optimization program: 
12 12 max max ( , , ) Ux x VE v x x
θ θ =         (3) 
where  E
θ   denotes the expectation operator over the distribution of θ  . Notice that expected 
utility was first axiomatized by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and is the common 
framework that is used in economic decision theory. We will, however, consider an 
alternative framework in section 4. In the main text of the paper, we provide the basic ideas 
and a summary of findings of economic literature. A more formal analysis can be found in the 
appendix.  
 
3. THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY AND LEARNING 
3.1 The effect of uncertainty 
Our first objective in this section is to present the effect of uncertainty. To do so, it is natural 
to compare the case of uncertainty represented in (3) to a case of certainty. This (hypothetical) 
case of certainty is usually constructed by replacing an uncertain model parameter by its 
expected value. In our case, we hereby assume that the random variable θ   can only take one 
value and therefore is replaced by its mean E
θθ  . The optimization problem in the certainty 
case is therefore given as follows: 
12 12 max max ( , , ) Cx x Vv x x E
θθ =         (4) 
We first study the effect of uncertainty on the value of the program, i.e. on “welfare”, and then 
on optimal decisions.  Page  6  14/09/2007 
To study the effect of uncertainty on welfare, we must compare  U V  and  C V . It is easy to see 
that  C V  is always larger than  U V  if and only if  12 (, ,) vx x θ  is concave in θ .
2 This immediately 
implies that  CU VV =  in Example 1, i.e. there is no effect of uncertainty since  (.) v  is linear in 
θ .
3 In Example 2, we have  CU VV ≥  by the concavity of  (.) u . The concavity of the 
instantaneous utility is usually interpreted as risk-aversion. Risk-aversion in Example 2 means 
that the DM prefers that the size of the stock of the resource is equal to E
θθ   rather than 
random and distributed as θ  . Equivalently, it means that the DM would be willing to pay an 
insurance premium to convert the uncertain resource stock θ   into a certain one E
θθ  . Risk-
aversion is obviously a fundamental concept in risk theory (Pratt, 1964; Arrow; 1971; Mas-
Collel, Whinston and Green, 1995; Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger, 2005).  
We now study the effect of uncertainty on decisions, in particular on  1 x . In Example 1, the 
linearity of the utility function in θ  immediately implies that uncertainty has no effect on  1 x . 
In Example 2, uncertainty may have an effect on the initial consumption  1 x . It is in fact the 
case unless the utility function is quadratic. The general result is that uncertainty decreases 
initial consumption if and only if marginal utility  '(.) u  is convex, or  '''(.) 0 u ≥ . This condition 
on the utility function is sufficient to induce a precautionary savings motive in standard 
microeconomic models of consumption and savings decisions (see, e.g., Leland 1968), to 
which Example 2 could be seen as the simplest illustration. Kimball (1990) coined the term 
“prudence” to refer to this condition. Notice that in Example 2 the effect of uncertainty on 
welfare depends on the second derivative of the utility function, while the effect of uncertainty 
on decisions depends on the third derivative of the utility function. This illustrates that, in 
expected utility theory, the various derivatives of the utility function capture fundamental but 
different economic aspects of risk preferences. Specifically the second derivative measures 
the intensity to which the DM wants to “escape” uncertainty, while the third derivative 
usually measures the direction and the intensity of the DM’s response to uncertainty.  
We emphasize here that the climate change model presented Example 1 does not capture 
some of the aspects related to risk preferences usually considered in the economic literature. 
                                                 
2 This immediately follows from Jensen’s inequality which states that  () ( ) Ef fE
θθ θ θ ≤    if and only if  f  is 
concave. 
3 See the appendix for a formal analysis.  Page  7  14/09/2007 
Indeed the DM’s utility function displays linearity in θ ; in other words, the DM is risk-
neutral. Still, we will see in the next section that learning may have an effect on the DM 
welfare and decisions even under risk-neutrality. 
Notice finally that we have considered extreme comparisons, i.e. studied the case of 
uncertainty and certainty. There exist more general notions of partial uncertainty and of 
increasing uncertainty (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970, 1971) that we briefly present in the 
appendix. 
 
3.2 The effect of learning 
Our next objective is to study the effect of learning. To do so, it is standard to compare the 
case of uncertainty represented in (3) to the case of learning in which the DM is informed 
about the value of θ   before making the decision in period 2. That is, the DM learns the 
realization of θ   before the period 2 decision,  2 x , but after the period 1 decision,  1 x .
4 
Formally, in the learning case, the optimization program is thus given by: 
12 12 max max ( , , ) Lx x VE v x x
θ θ =         (5) 
As before, we analyze the effect of learning on welfare first and then on decisions.   
Comparing  L V  to  U V , it is obvious that
5 
22 12 12 max ( , , ) max ( , , ) xx E v xx E v xx
θθ θ θ ≥          (6)   
This implies that the DM always prefers the situation in which there is learning, that is, the 
situation in which he can optimally adjust  2 x  to the realized value of the random variable θ .  
Consequently, by taking the maximand over  1 x  of each expression in (6) we indeed get 
LU VV ≥ . In other words, the value of information is always positive. This general result holds 
in fact as long as the DM is an expected utility maximizer (see, e.g., Marschak and Miyasawa 
1968).
6 It should be noted that for the case of perfect information not only the ex ante 
                                                 
4 We here only consider the case in which new information is acquired exogenously over time, e.g. by 
independent scientific progress. We do not consider active experimentation, that is, a situation where the learning 
rate is influenced by the decisions in the first period. 
5 Note that the max operator is convex and we can again use Jensen’s inequality. 
6 Note that we only consider the case of a single decision maker. As an example of an analysis of interaction of 
multiple decision-makers, see Kolstad and Ulph (this issue).  Page  8  14/09/2007 
expected utility, but also the ex post utility are increased compared to no-learning. This is 
generally different if the information does not perfectly reveal the parameter θ , as we discuss 
in the online material. In such a case, information can be misleading: for example, the new 
pieces of information suggest a smaller probability of severe climate damages, therefore 
leading to less strict climate policy, while in the end damages turn out to be immense.
7 
Oppenheimer et al. (this issue) refer to instances in which information is misleading in this 
manner as “negative learning”. 
While the value of information is always positive, the impact of learning on decisions is 
generally ambiguous. That is, the optimal  1 x  in (3) may be larger or smaller than the optimal 
1 x  in (5), depending on the value of the parameters of the model.  
Indeed in Example 1, the effect of learning is ambiguous in general, even under risk-
neutrality. It can easily be shown, however, that for quadratic utility and for quadratic damage 
functions perfect learning leads to an increase, and not a decrease, of first period emissions 
compared to the case of uncertainty (see Ulph and Ulph, 1997). Hence, this gives an example 
in which the prospect of learning over time provides a rationale for emitting more, and not 
less, pollution today. The intuition is that, under learning, there is an incentive to delay 
emissions reduction efforts. This allows future reduction efforts to be adapted to the severity 
of the climate risk that will be known in the future due to learning. It should be noted, 
however, that this result is not general, namely the positive effect of learning on emissions is 
not robust to other (non quadratic) functional forms. 
In Example 2, it can be shown that learning increases resource depletion compared to the case 
of uncertainty if the third derivative of u  is positive, that is under the condition of prudence 
(Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Treich, 2005). The intuition is that learning in the future will allow 
perfect consumption smoothing which operates as a reduction of the future uncertainty. 
Therefore it makes sense that the condition of prudence is instrumental here as well; indeed 
we know from the previous section that the effect of uncertainty on early consumption 
depends on the condition of prudence. Hence for “imprudent” consumers the result is 
reversed, in the sense that learning decreases early consumption. 
                                                 
7 There are few other general results on the determinants and the magnitude of the value of information however 
(Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992). But the value of information has been routinely computed in specific numerical 
climate-economy models, e.g. Manne and Richels (1992) and Nordhaus (1994).  Page  9  14/09/2007 
In summary, we can conclude that, even if perfect learning has always a positive effect on 
welfare, the qualitative impact on today’s decisions is generally ambiguous, and may or may 
not go in the opposite direction compared to the effect of uncertainty. Moreover observe that 
we only study the effect of perfect learning, that is the effect of having perfect information 
about the parameter θ . In the appendix, we present a formal definition for better information 
that does not require information to be perfect. It is obvious, however, that one cannot expect 
less ambiguous results on decisions for the case when learning only imperfectly resolves the 
uncertainty since the results are ambiguous even under perfect learning.  
Finally, it is important to indicate that the literature on the effect of learning on early decisions 
often refers to the “irreversibility effect”. There is indeed a general result that learning always 
favors less irreversible decisions (Arrow and Fisher, 1974, Henry, 1974). We notice that the 
framework used for analyzing the irreversibility effect is slightly different from the one that 
we have considered so far. Indeed the analysis of the irreversibility focuses on the effect of the 
current decision on the future set of choice. We formally discuss the relationship with 
literature on the irreversibility effect in the appendix. 
 
4. THE EFFECT OF AMBIGUITY 
4.1 Introduction to the concept of ambiguity 
In our analysis so far we have assumed that the DM behaves as an expected utility maximizer. 
That is, his beliefs upon the uncertainty parameter θ   are represented by an additive 
probability measure π ∈Π which is potentially updated according to Bayes rule when new 
information is received. Preferences are linear in the probabilities. However, one might 
question the applicability of the expected utility framework to the problem of climate change 
where no objective probability assessment exists (e.g., IPCC, 1995; Morgan and Keith, 1995). 
Furthermore, empirical evidence indicates that, when facing uncertainty, people quite often do 
not maximize expected utility.
8 Such violations have led to the development of several 
alternatives.  
In this section, we report some findings from non-expected utility theories applied to the 
climate change problem. We focus on theories that deviate from the assumption of a single 
                                                 
8 Prominent examples based on experiments are given by Allais (1953), Ellsberg (1964) and Kahneman and 
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underlying (objective or subjective) probability distribution and instead allow for multiple 
priors. Useful published references on these theories include Gilboa (1987), Schmeidler 
(1986), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Camerer and Weber (1992), Klibanoff (2001) and 
Klibanoff et al. (2005). These theories explicitly allow for ambiguity-aversion as opposed to 
risk-aversion, as we will see. In climate policy, such multiple priors π ∈Π of probability 
distributions over climate damage θ  arise naturally from the use of different models: 
Predictions from each scientific model are usually given in confidence intervals, i.e. each 
models generates a probability distribution over outcomes.
9 Similarly, ambiguity naturally 
arises if experts disagree in their predictions of the future climatic damage. Decision makers 
therefore have to aggregate findings from these competing models, or from different experts, 
i.e. they have to deal with a whole set of probability distributions. Under expected utility, 
decision makers behave as if they still base decisions on a single probability distribution, e.g. 
by using the average. However observed choice data have often indicated that individuals 
behave differently: they seem to place excessive weight on the most pessimistic probability 
distribution (Ellsberg, 1964). Consistent with these observations, Gilboa and Schmeidler 
(1989) axiomatize a framework in which decisions are derived from the minimal expected 
utility obtained from a probability distribution in the set of priors,, which represents this focus 
on the worst case. Ambiguity is then modeled by the size of the set of probability 
distributions. 
Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (hereafter KMM) (2005) consider a more general 
ambiguity model than the one of Gilboa and Schmeidler. They model second-order 
probability distributions, or equivalently “smooth ambiguity”. Formally, a DM chooses the 
action which maximizes  () 1 2 () (( , , ) ) EE v x x µπ πθ φ θ    where µ  is a subjective probability over the 
set π ∈Π of probability distributions over θ  and φ  is an increasing transformation. 
Compared to the expected utility framework, the novelty in the KMM framework is therefore 
the introduction of this function φ  by which the expected utility measures stemming from the 
respective probability distributions are evaluated. φ  thereby captures the attitude towards 
ambiguity over probability distributions, i.e. towards differences in expected utility measures 
                                                 
9 Compare, for example, with the policy of the IPCC to account for uncertainties by classifying uncertainties as 
ranges of probabilities (IPCC, 2005).  Page  11  14/09/2007 
implied by the different probability distributions.
10 In particular, a concave φ  (' ' 0 φ < ) models 
ambiguity-aversion. Indeed, it can easily be seen that when the probability distributions 
become “more dispersed” then welfare decreases if and only if φ  is concave. The qualitative 
effects of ambiguity-aversion can most easily be seen when relying on a special functional 
form ( ) (1/ )exp( ) vv φ αα =− − : on the one hand, the limit of ambiguity-neutrality ( ( ) vv φ = ) 
and therefore the standard expected utility framework results for  0 α → . On the other hand, 
KMM’s model yields Gilboa and Schmeidler’s MaxiMin model as a limiting case for 
infinitely ambiguity-averse DM (α →∞).  
 
4.2 The effect of ambiguity-aversion 
We use the model of smooth ambiguity-aversion (KMM, 2005) to demonstrate how decisions 
under uncertainty can change when decision makers are ambiguity-averse and thereby deviate 
from expected utility maximization. We hereby concentrate on optimization programs under 
uncertainty, analogously to (3): 
12 () 1 2 () max max ( ( , , )) Ux x VE E v x x µπ πθ φ θ =          (7) 
where φ  is increasing and concave.  
We show in the appendix how the solution to problem (7) depends on the attitude of the DM 
towards ambiguity. For Example 1, increased ambiguity-aversion is shown to decrease the 
emission level implemented in period 1 in the case of uncertainty. Since for expected utility 
maximizers, uncertainty on the damage parameter had no effect on decisions in Example 1 
(see section 2.2), ambiguity-aversion can therefore explain why (risk-neutral) decision makers 
might react to uncertainties regarding future damages by reducing emissions, i.e. increasing 
abatement efforts. 
In Example 2, however, the impact of ambiguity is less clear. Qualitatively, ambiguity-
aversion can change the predictions of the effect of uncertainty. We can take quadratic utility 
functions as an example. For such functions, we have  '''(.) 0 u = , and therefore our results in 
section 3.1 showed that uncertainty had no effect on decisions if the DM maximizes expected 
utility, i.e. is ambiguity-neutral. Under ambiguity-aversion, however, uncertainty has an 
                                                 
10 Note that risk-aversion is still captured by the concavity of v  in θ .  Page  12  14/09/2007 
ambiguous effect (see the appendix). In particular, one can construct examples where an 
increased ambiguity-aversion implies more consumption in both periods.  
We have thus introduced a more general framework that allows welfare to decrease when 
probability distributions become different, provided that the DM displays ambiguity-aversion. 
However, the decisions of an ambiguity-averse DM compared to those of an ambiguity-
neutral DM (that is, an expected utility maximizer) can be higher or lower. Nevertheless, 
Example 1 illustrates a situation in which ambiguity-aversion always leads to less emissions.  
 
4.3 Discussion of further applications of ambiguity-aversion 
The analysis above considered the effects of ambiguity-aversion only for the case in which 
decision makers cannot expect new information before making the decisions in the second 
period. A complete discussion of perfect and partial learning under ambiguity is beyond the 
scope of this paper. We therefore only shortly discuss some issues which arise when new 
information is explicitly considered in such an ambiguity-averse model. 
First, the model outlined above which was based on KMM (2005) only applies to evaluating 
expected utility measures generated from different probability distributions at one particular 
point in time. This clearly does not cover most applications to the climate change problem, 
where new information may change the underlying probability distributions and therefore 
require a reevaluation in future periods. An intertemporal version of ambiguity-aversion 
model is proposed by KMM (2006). In general, the impact of ambiguity-aversion on decisions 
under learning again depends on the specific functional forms, i.e. how exactly today’s 
decisions affect current and future utility.  
While we will not extensively discuss this framework here in order to limit the technicalities, 
we want to point out some difficulties which arise when incorporating ambiguity-aversion 
into an intertemporal decision making context (see Machina, 1989, Epstein and le Breton, 
1993, Karni and Schmeidler, 1991). First, it is no longer obvious how to incorporate new 
information to update beliefs. While in an expected utility framework, prior beliefs are 
transformed via Bayesian updating, a number of different updating rules exists to deal with a  Page  13  14/09/2007 
situation under ambiguity, i.e. with multiple priors.
11  Moreover, applying these updated rules 
in a dynamic framework can induce decisions to be “dynamically inconsistent”.
12  
Several ways of dealing with these inconsistencies have been proposed: (i) preferences can be 
defined in a recursive way, that is ex ante preferences are based on ex post preferences and 
cannot be reduced to a simple form (e.g., KMM, 2006; Epstein and Schneider, 2003). (ii) 
preferences can be non-consequentalist, that is future preferences can depend on (non-
materialized) branches of the decision tree. Finally, (iii) decisions can be limited to 
“behaviorally consistent” choices. That is, one accepts the fact that preferences can be 
dynamically inconsistent but focuses only on decisions which will be carried out given future 
information. Here, in a decision tree, future choice nodes are replaced by future choices 
(Karni and Safra, 1989).  
The implications of these extensions of ambiguity models in our two-decision framework are 
largely unexplored and remain subject to future research. A first illustration of the effects for 
Example 1 is given in Lange (2003) who relies on a behaviorally consistent approach. Lange’s 
results are illustrative of the subtleties of an analysis of multi-period decision problems under 
ambiguity: dynamic inconsistencies in a behaviorally consistent approach can yield a negative 
value of learning (see, more generally,Wakker, 1988). That is, for instance in Example 1, 
ambiguity-averse people could choose not to receive new information on prospective climate 
damages.  
 
5. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIMATE POLICY 
In this paper, we derived some theoretic results on the effect of uncertainty and learning. We 
based our analysis on a single individual decision maker, i.e. we did not address strategic 
interactions between multiple decision-makers. Our two-decision model encompasses most 
previous microeconomics models of climate change, such as those of Kolstad (1996), Ulph 
and Ulph (1997) and Gollier, Jullien and Treich (2000) and illustrates the basic determinants 
                                                 
11 As one starts with multiple probability distributions (e.g. Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), one could update each 
prior distribution individually and use all distributions for future decision making, or, alternatively, only keep 
those probability distributions which gave the observed event the maximal probability. Remember that the 
probability distributions could stem from sensitivity analyses of different, competing climate models. Now, after 
observing new events, the question could be to what extent one shifts the decision weights towards those models 
which were best in predicting the observed event. 
12 That is, viewed from the start of period 1, an optimal policy to implement in period 2 may not be optimal 
anymore when this policy will be reconsidered at the start of period 2.  Page  14  14/09/2007 
of numerical results such as those in the climate economies of Nordhaus (1994) and Ha 
Duong (1998).  
Uncertainty in our framework is captured by an uncertain climate damage parameter. 
Uncertainty generally has a negative effect on welfare in climate change models in which the 
climate damages are monetarized and the decision-maker is risk-averse in wealth. Hence, 
there is an incentive to avoid uncertain situations. In contrast, we showed that the effect of 
uncertainty on decisions is ambiguous, and depends on how intertemporal costs and benefits 
are specified (Example 1 vs. Example 2).  
When dealing with long-term decision making processes it is, however, important to realize 
that active research or experimentation as well as passive waiting can yield new information. 
From an economic perspective, this information is only valuable if it can lead to a change in 
future decisions. In our model, we therefore explicitly considered the effects of learning, i.e. 
the ability of decision-makers to gain new information on the uncertain model parameters 
(e.g., climate damages or future consumption possibilities) before the second period decisions 
have to be made. Such learning was shown to always have a positive effect on welfare 
compared the situation of no learning. While the value of information is therefore always 
positive ex ante, it should be noted that future information can clearly also be misleading, e.g. 
it could suggest a smaller probability of severe climate damages while in the end damages 
turn out to be immense. The ex ante positive value of information must therefore be 
differentiated from the positive or negative ex post consequences of adjusting the climate 
policy after receiving new information. 
Future information affects, however, not only future decisions. Instead, the expectation of 
receiving new information in the future can already change today’s decisions, e.g. on climate 
policy. The qualitative effect is less clear: the microeconomics literature has not given a 
definitive answer to how climate policy decisions should respond to learning. In particular, 
there is no general support for the argument to delay abatement of emissions if learning is 
expected.  
While these results depend on the assumption of a (Bayesian) expected utility framework, 
there is some doubt about its applicability to deriving predictions for climate policy: on the 
one hand, it is well-known that expected utility often fails to explain observed individual 
decisions under uncertainty. On the other hand, the expected utility framework does not  Page  15  14/09/2007 
capture the existing ambiguity over the probability distribution to use in climate change 
models. We therefore discussed a more general model which allows for ambiguity-aversion 
and in which welfare is reduced when initial priors are more dispersed. Such ambiguity-
aversion leads to reduced emissions when utility is linear in the damage parameter while no 
definite results can be obtained for more general utility specifications.  
In conclusion, there is little theoretic support for any claim that uncertainty and learning 
should affect climate policy in a specific direction. That is, the simple fact of the existence of 
uncertainty and the potential for learning does not support any strong position either to reduce 
or to delay emissions abatement.  The effect depends not only on the functional forms of the 
damage and utility functions, but also on the specific modeling approach. From this 
perspective, the scientific debate on the impact of uncertainty and learning on climate policy 
is, we believe, mostly an empirical matter. This should, at least, be a word of caution to 
policy-makers, and to some extent to some environmentalists and politicians. 
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APPENDIX  
A1. The effect of uncertainty, learning and ambiguity in the “climate change model” 
In this section, we give some formal insights on the sign of the effect of uncertainty, learning 
and ambiguity in the Example 1, that is when the DM’s primitive utility equals 
12 1 2 1 2 (, ,) () ()( 1 )( ) vx x ux ux dx x θ θ =+− − + .  
The first order conditions for problem (3) characterizing optimal emissions under uncertainty, 
denoted  1
U x , are the same as those for problem (4) and are given by 
12 1 2 '( ) '( ) (1 ) '( )
UU U U ux ux E dx x
θθ == − +         ( A 1 )  
Consequently, emissions under uncertainty are not different from emissions under certainty. 
We now study the effect of learning. The first order conditions for problem (5) are given by 
11 2
21 2
'( ) (1 ) '( ( ))
' ( () ) ( 1 )' ( () )
LL
L







       (A2) 
where  1
L x  and  2() x θ  denote optimal emissions in the learning case. Comparing (A1) and 
(A2) implies that  11
LU x x >  if and only if  12 (1 ) '( ( )) dx x θ θ − +  with  2() x θ  defined by 
21 2 '( ( )) (1 ) '( ( )) ux dx x θ θθ =− +  is concave (resp. convex) in θ . While this is ambiguous in 
general, it can easily be shown that for quadratic utility and damage functions that 
12 (1 ) '( ( )) dx x θ θ −+  is concave in θ . Therefore, perfect learning leads to increase, and not 
decrease, first period emissions for quadratic utility functions, as stated in the text. For a 
complete demonstration and intuition of this result, see Ulph and Ulph (1997). 
In the context of the smooth ambiguity-aversion model, the general first order conditions for 
first and second period decisions based on problem (7) are given by:   
( ) 12 12 () () 0 '( ( , , ))[ ( , , ))]
i x EE v x xE v x x µπ πθ πθ φ θθ =    for both  1,2 i =  (A.3) 
To determine the impact of ambiguity-aversion on the decision  1 x , that is comparing (3) and 
(7), it is essential to study the  ' φ -weights attached to the marginal expected utility based on a 
probability distribution π  in the first order condition (A.3).    Page  19  14/09/2007 
Let us define  12 ( ) 12 () () () ' ( (, ,) ) / ' ( (, ,) ) Ev x x E Ev x x µπ πθ πθ µ πφ θ φ θ = 
  . We can then rewrite 
condition (A.3) as  () 1 2 () 0[( , , ) ) ]
i x EE v x x µπ πθ θ =    , that is, the ambiguity-averse DM acts as if his 
beliefs over the set of probability distributions are distorted from µ  to µ  . Note, however, that 
these new weights µ   depend on expected utility and therefore on the optimal decisions  i x . 
Hence ambiguity-aversion operates as follows: compared to µ , probability distributions 
which give a small expected utility are overweighted, while those π  with comparably large 
expected utility receive a small  ( ) µ π  . 
The effect of ambiguity-aversion therefore depends on whether – when comparing two 
probability distributions π  and π  – a larger marginal expected utility is associated with a 
larger or a smaller expected utility.  
For Example 1, it is obvious that  
12 12 () ()
12 12 () ()
12 12 () ()
(1 ) '( ) (1 ) '( )
(, ,) (, ,)
'( ( , , )) '( ( , , ))
Ed x x Ed x x
Ev x x Ev x x
















      
That is, the larger the weight which is implicitly attached to a probability distribution due to 
ambiguity-aversion, the larger the expected damages are. In this model, this is equivalent to 
larger expected marginal damages. This implies that increased ambiguity-aversion leads to 
smaller emission levels in period 1.  
 
A2. The effect of uncertainty, learning and ambiguity in the “resource depletion model”  
In this section, we give some formal insights to sign the effect of uncertainty, learning and 
ambiguity in the Example 2, that is when the DM’s primitive utility equals 
12 1 2 1 2 (, ,) () () ( ) vx x ux ux u x x θ θ =++ − − . 
The first order conditions for problem (3) characterizing optimal resource consumption under 
uncertainty  1
U x  in Example 2 are given by 
12 1 2 '( ) '( ) '( )
UU U U ux ux E u x x
θ θ ==− −        (A.4)  Page  20  14/09/2007 
Notice that, in contrast, under certainty, the first order conditions are given by 
12 1 2 '( ) '( ) '( ) ux ux uE x x
θθ == − −   . Comparing the previous first order conditions, it is not 
difficult to show that uncertainty decreases consumption if and only if  12 '( ) Eu x x
θ θ −−    is 
larger than  12 '( ) uE x x
θθ −−    for any  1 x  and  2 x . Using again the Jensen’s inequality, this is 
true if and only if marginal utility  '(.) u  is convex, or  '''(.) 0 u ≥ , as stated in the text (Leland, 
1968; Kimball, 1990). For a simple demonstration and intuition on this result, see for example 
Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (2005). 
We now examine the effect of learning. In period 2, that is when the value of θ  is known to 
the DM, it is optimal to perfectly smooth consumption. Optimal consumption thus equals 
21 () 0 . 5 ( ) x x θ θ =− . The initial problem thus reduces to maximize  11 ()2 ( 0 . 5 ( ) ) ux Eu x
θ θ +−    
over  1 x . (Under weak assumptions on the utility function, it is never optimal to run the risk of 
consuming all the resource in the initial period which insures interiority). The first order 
condition for initial consumption under learning is then given by 
11 '( ) '(0.5( ))
LL ux E u x
θ θ =−            (A.5) 
Comparing conditions (A.4) and (A.5), it is not difficult to show that learning increases initial 
consumption if and only if  12 '( ) Eu x x
θ θ −−    is larger than  1 '(0.5( )) Eu x
θ θ −    for any  1 x  and  2 x  
characterized by the equality  21 2 '( ) '( ) ux E u x x
θ θ =− −   . But then notice that we can write 
12 2 12 '( ) 0.5 '( ) 0.5 '( ) Eu x x u x Eu x x
θθ θθ −− = + −−    which, under  '''(.) 0 u ≥  and the Jensen’s 
inequality, is larger than  1 '(0.5( )) Eu x
θ θ −   , which is the condition that we precisely look for. 
For a complete demonstration and intuition of this result, see Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Treich 
(2005). 
To show the effects of ambiguity-aversion on decision, we concentrate on quadratic utility 
functions 
2 () / 2 ux x x αβ =−  (with  / x α β ≤  and  0 β > ). We obtain 
12 1 2 () () (, ,) ) [ ]
i xi Ev x x E xxx πθ πθ θβ θ = −−−            
2
12 1 2 1 2 1 2 () () () (, ,) ) () () [ ](/ 2 ) [ ( ) ] E vx x ux ux E x x E x x
πθ πθ πθ θα θ β θ =++ − − − − −      
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which implies that expected marginal utility only depends on the expected value  () Eπθθ   while 
expected utility additionally depends on the variance of θ  . Considering condition (A.3) and 
by linking a larger mean to a larger variance of θ  , one can therefore construct examples 
where a larger expected marginal expected utility is linked to a smaller expected utility (and 
the other way around). Hence, in general, ambiguity-aversion has an ambiguous impact on 
decisions under uncertainty in Example 2 as claimed in the text. 
 
A3. Partial uncertainty and partial learning 
In the paper, we have considered extreme comparisons, that is, certainty vs. uncertainty, and 
learning vs. no learning. We now introduce the more general concepts of partial uncertainty 
and partial learning. 
Let us start with the notion of partial uncertainty. This notion builds on the literature on 
stochastic dominance which dates back to the mathematicians Hardy, Littlewood and Polya 
(1934). The dominant concept used in economics is that of a mean-preserving increase in risk 
by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). The random variable  ' θ   is a mean-preserving increase in 
risk of θ   if and only if:  
' for any convex function  ,  ( ') ( ) f Ef Ef
θθ θ θ ≥        (A.6) 
This is a particular case of second order stochastic dominance in which the two random 
variables must have the same mean. Any risk-averse agent dislikes mean-preserving increase 
in risk. See Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971) for a thorough analysis of the notion risk-aversion, 
and see Samuelson (1967) for a general proof that risk-averse agents like diversification. The 
first systematic analysis of the effect of mean-preserving increase in risk on decisions was 
developed in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971). For an overview on stochastic dominance and its 
effects on decisions, see for instance Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (2005).  
The general notion of partial learning relies on that of a better information structure. It dates 
back to the mathematicians Bohnenblust, Shapley, and Sherman (1949), and especially to 
Blackwell (1951). A convenient definition is introduced by Marschak and Miyasawa (1968). 
Let  y   (resp.  ' y  ) an information structure correlated with θ  , and  y π  (resp.  'y π ) the vector of  Page  22  14/09/2007 
posterior probabilities of θ   after observing  y . Let also define S  the set of probability 
distributions. Then  y   is a better information structure than  ' y   if and only if: 
'' for any convex function   on  ,  ( ) ( ' ) yy y y SE E ρ ρπ ρπ ≥       (A.7) 
Thus a better information structure induces a mean-preserving spread in posterior beliefs. 
Notice that the function 
2 12 / ()m a x ( ,, ) yx y Ev x x θ ρ πθ =    is always convex in posterior beliefs 
y π  since it is the maximum of linear functions of  y π . Hence any better information structure 
increases ex ante expected utility. 
Using Marschak and Miyasawa (1968)’s definition, Epstein (1980) derives a general theorem 
which permits investigation of the effect of learning on decisions under some differentiability 
assumptions. Jones and Ostroy (1984) generalize Epstein’s theorem to non-differentiable 
problems. Gollier, Jullien and Treich (2000) show that the theorem does not usually yield 
unambiguous restrictions on the primitives of the model, i.e. on  12 (, ,) vx x θ . 
 
A4. The “irreversibility effect” 
In some situations, decisions at one point in time may affect the set of possible decisions that 
can be made later in the future. Specifically, a current decision may be irreversible in the 
sense that it prevents the DM from selecting a future decision. This so-called irreversibility 
constraint should be taken into account at the initial stage, i.e. when the current decision is 
made. In the paper, we did not consider irreversibility constraints. We show now how to 
incorporate irreversibility constraints in our framework. In doing so, we also demonstrate the 
“irreversibility effect”, a general effect that states that learning always favors less irreversible 
decisions. 
The essence of how an irreversibility constraint impacts the current decision is best captured 
in a classical example of an irreversible investment problem. Let  12 1 2 (, ,) vx x x x θ θ =+  with 
the decision set of  11 {0,1} xD ∈=  and  21 1 (){, 1 } x Dx x ∈ = . Here the choice at date 2 is 
explicitly restricted by the date 1 decision: the project is irreversible in the sense that once it is 
developed it cannot be stopped ( 2 1 x =  if  1 1 x = ). Under uncertainty, program (3) becomes  
12 1 {0,1}, { ,1} 1 2 max ( ) max(1 ,0) xx x Ex x E
θθ θθ ∈∈ += +          (A.8)  Page  23  14/09/2007 
The project is implemented today if its expected present value is positive, that is if 
10 E
θθ +≥   , or it is never implemented. Consider alternatively the case of perfect learning. 
Program (4) becomes 
12 1 {0,1} { ,1} 1 2 max max ( ) max(1 , max(0, )) xx x Ex x E E
θθ θ θ θθ ∈∈ += +        (A.9) 
The present value of postponing the decision to develop the project equals  max(0, ) VE
θ θ =   . 
The project will be initiated today only if it yields a larger present value than that obtained if 
the decision is postponed to the future: 1 EV
θθ + ≥   . The quantity V  has been coined the 
(quasi-) option value (Arrow and Fisher, 1974). The prospect of receiving perfect information 
in the future thus increases the cost of choosing the irreversible decision today from 0 to V . 
This irreversible decision would indeed prevent the DM from taking advantage of information 
in the future. This is a general result coined the ‘irreversibility effect’ (Henry, 1974). See Ha 
Duong (1998) for a numerical application to the climate change problem. 
Epstein (1980) generalizes the irreversibility effect to partial learning; but he has shown that 
this effect does not usually hold for a general non-separable payoff function, that is when  
12 (, ,) vx x θ  is not of the form  11 22 () (,) vx vxθ + . In other words, when the payoff function is 
non-separable one cannot be sure that better forthcoming information biases current decision 
in favor of less irreversibility (that is, inducing a larger set of future choices). Non-separability 
actually holds in the Examples 1 and 2. The interested reader is referred to Kolstad (1996), 
Ulph and Ulph (1997) and Gollier, Jullien and Treich (2000) for a discussion of the non-
separability involved in a climate change model when combined with an irreversibility 
constraint. Importantly, Narain, Hanemann and Fisher (2007) provide a more general 
definition of irreversibility that can be used to study the effect of learning in some models 
with a non-separable payoff function. 
 